Michigan Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 8

1957

Evidence - Examination of Witnesses - Surprise as Grounds for
Impeaching a Party's Own Witness
John A. Ziegler, Jr. S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Raymond Dittrich
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Ziegler, Jr. S.Ed. & Raymond Dittrich, Evidence - Examination of Witnesses - Surprise as Grounds
for Impeaching a Party's Own Witness, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1180 (1957).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss8/11

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1180

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

EVIDENCE-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES-SURPRISE AS GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHING A PARTY'S OWN WITNESS-The defendant was convicted of the
statutory rape of his stepdaughter. Immediately following the alleged offense, the victim had signed a statement accusing the defendant of the crime
charged. Before the trial, however, the district attorney was advised by
the defense counsel, and by the victim herself, that the written statement
was not true. At the trial, when called as a witness by the commonwealth,
the girl repudiated her earlier statement, whereupon the district attorney
pleaded surprise and was permitted to use the prior statement to impeach.
On appeal, held, affirmed. The district attorney was "actually surprised"
when the witness repudiated her earlier statement, and so he could impeach
the witness to neut;ralize the effect of the unexpected testimony. Commonwealth v. Bowers, (Pa. Super. 1956) 127 A. (2d) 806.
·
By the early common law rule a party could not impeach his own witness1 by prior inconsistent statements.2 The rule has yielded a little to
severe criticism,3 and now, in most jurisdictions, either by statute or by

1 Ladd,

"Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments," 4

UNIV.

Cm. L.

REv. 69 (1936). The reasons advanced for the rule are (1) that the party by calling the

witness to testify vouches for his trustworthiness, (2) that by having the power to impeach
puts a powerful coercive tool in the hands of a party in getting a witness to testify a
certain way. The answers advanced against these reasons are that as to the first the fact is
that a party usually has little choice in choosing his witness and as to the second, it would
have validity only if a party could impeach by showing bad character. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §38 (1954).
2 It is clear that under no circuxnstances will a party be allowed to impeach his own
witness by showing bad character or corruption. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§900,
901 (1940).
3 3 WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §896 et seq. (1940); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §38 (1954).
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court rule, a party is allowed to impeach his witness by cross-examination.4
Two requirements have been judicially grafted onto these statutes and
court rules, viz., the party calling the witness must be surprised by the testimony, and the testimony itself must be damaging.5 '\,Vhat will constitute
surprise is said to rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.6 The
problem presented by the principal case is whether or not notice that a
witness' testimony will not be as expected is sufficient to negate a claim of
surprise at the trial.7 The courts have not agreed on the answer to this
question. Many state, and a few fed~ral, decisions hold that when a party
has reasonable notice that the testimony of his witness will be different from
that which was anticipated, the party cannot claim surprise.8 These courts
seem to require a complete lack of awareness on the part of counsel that
the witness will change his story. In some states, however, and in most of
the federal courts, prior notice alone is not enough to defeat a claim of
surprise.9 These courts seem not to regard surprise as the equivalent of
being taken unaware. Rather, by comparing the statements relied upon
with the notice of change, they look to see whether the party was reasonably justified in expecting the witness to testify a certain way.10 The Ian4 For a discussion of the various types of statutes, see Ladd, "Impeachment of One's
Own Witness-New Developments,'' 4 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1936). Also see 11 OHIO STATE
L.J. 364 (1950). Illinois seems to be one of the few states still adhering to the common
law rule. See 1953 !LL. L. FORUM 296.
5 Young v. United States, (5th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 200; Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Cr.
362, 102 P. 57 (1909); People v. LeBeau, 39 Cal. (2d) 146, 245 P. (2d) 302 (1952), noted
in 42 CALIF. L. REv. 178 (1954). See 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931) on the right of a party surprised
by unfavorable testimony of own witness to ask him concerning previous inconsistent
statements.
6 Wheeler v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 211 F. (2d) 19; Sturgis v. State, note 5
supra. In United States v. Maggio, (3d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 155, it was held that there
was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's acceptance of an unsworn statement by counsel that he was surprised as the basis for allowing impeachment of a witness called by
counsel. As was said in London Guarantee &: Accident Co. v. Woelfle, (8th Cir. 1936)
83 F. (2d) 325 at 334, "the claim of surprise has become largely a gesture, which adds
little or nothing to the trial court's discretion."
7 There was no problem over whether the prosecutor's case had been damaged in the
principal case. The courts generally hold that the scope of impeachment is limited to
neutralizing the damage caused by the surprising testimony. See People v. Le Beau, note 5
supra.
s See Gondek v. Pliska, 135 Conn. 610, 67 A. (2d) 552 (1949); State v. Johnson, 220
La. 1075, 58 S. (2d) 389 (1952); Thompson v. State, 97 Okla. Cr. 253, 261 P. (2d) 900
(1953); Williams v. State, 184 Ark. 622, 43 S.W. (2d) 731 (1931); Young v. United States,
note 5 supra.
9 Wheeler v. United States, note 6 supra; Weaver v. United States, (9th Cir. 1954) 216
F. (2d) 23; United States v. Graham, (2d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 436; People v. Spinosa, 115
Cal. App. (2d) 659, 252 P. (2d) 409 (1953).
10 See the Graham case, note 9 supra, where the district attorney was allowed to crossexamine his witness as to statements made at two former trials even though the witness
had told the district attorney that he would not so testify and that the prior statements
were false. The court said in effect that the district attorney was privileged to believe that
when the witness was placed under oath he would testify as he had done at the two prior
trials. For a very liberal view see London Guarantee &: Accident Co. v. Woelfle, note 6
supra, where the plaintiff was allowed to impeach her own witness "in the interest of seeking truth and securing justice."
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guage of the court in the principal case seems to place 1t m this line of
authority.11 From the cases suggesting this more liberal approach, at
least two rules of thumb can be derived. Usually, if the statement relied
upon was given under oath and the contradictory one was not, it is said
that a party is justified in calling the witness with the expectation that he
will testify in accordance with his prior statement.1 2 Conversely, where the
form of notice is under oath and the statement relied upon is not, most
courts would find no surprise.13 When bot:1;1 statements are either under
oath or unsworn no general rule of prediction can be made.1 4
The no-impeachment rule seems questionable at best.1 5 The chief reason currently advanced in support of the rule is the fear that a party will
call a witness whom he knows to be hostile in order to get the prior statements before the jury, hoping that the jury will use them (improperly, of

11 See principal case, at 808, where the court says, ". . . the Commonwealth was
entirely justified in believing that ... she would respect the sanctity of her oath, and that
her testimony in all probability would accord with the recitals of her statement freely
given immediately after the event."
12 Wheeler v. United States, see note 6 supra; United States v. Graham, note 9 supra.
13 State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E. (2d) 72 (1940); Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enterprise, Inc., 98 Cal. App. (2d) 240, 219 P. (2d) 928 (1950). Clearly in a jurisdiction which
applies a strict rule the same result would follow. See Hartley v. Crede, (W. Va. 1954)
82 S.E. (2d) 672. Contra, Weaver v. United States, note 9 supra.
14 See People v. Spinosa, note 9 supra, where two contradictory statements were given
under oath at the same proceeding and the party was allowed to rely on one. Sullivan v.
United States, (9th Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 147.
15 It should be noted that surprise is not the only ground upon which a party may
be permitted to put in prior inconsistent statements to impeach his own witness. As the
principal case indicates, where the party has no choice in calling the witness, he will be
allowed to impeach the witness without showing surprise. People v. Deitz, 86 Mich. 419,
449 N.W. 296 (1891); Commonwealth v. Sarkis, 164 Pa. Super. 194, 63 A. (2d) 360 (1949);
Meeks v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 319. Some courts will call a witness on
their own initiative or at the request of a party when neither side is willing to vouch for
the witness' veracity. Young v. United States, (5th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 490. [This case
is a sequel to the first action, Young v. United States, note 5 supra. Following the holding
in the first trial that the prosecuting attorney could not legitimately claim to be surprised,
the prosecuting attorney, on retrial of the defendant, asked the court to call the witness
as its own. The trial judge indicated that he did so, not because requested by the government, but because the witness was an eyewitness whose testimony was needed. The case
was noted in 18 TEX. L. R.Ev. 530 (1940).] See also United States v. Lutwak, (7th Cir.
1952) 195 F. (2d) 748; Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Dist. Co., (5th Cir.
1944) 143 F. (2d) 826. If the witness is called by the court, both parties are free to crossexamine and to impeach. If the court thinks that the party wants the witness called solely
for the purpose of impeachment, it will refuse. See Fong Lum Kwai v. United States, (9th
Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 19, and Young v. United States, (5th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 490.
It should be noted that many courts allow prior inconsistent statements to come before
the jury on the grounds of refreshing recollection. Hurley v. State, 46 Ohio 320, 21
N.E. 645 (1889); Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1893). This will be permissible,
however, only if the witness confesses either a lack of knowledge or a failure of memory.
Another group of cases indicates that, instead of permitting impeachment, a court may
order all of the witness' testimony stricken from the record if the party who called the
witness cannot elicit from him the information expected. Kuhn v. United States, (9th
Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 910. See also Young v. United States, note 5 supra, and State v.
Thome, 43 Wash. (2d) 47, 260 P. (2d) 331 (1953).
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course) as substantive evidence.16 Essential to this reasoning is the belief
that these prior statements are hearsay.17 Yet in this type of situation the
declarant (witness) is in court and is subject to cross-examination, and
there is little reason why this testimony should not be used as substantive
evidence.1 8 Neither is there strong reason to maintain the ban against impeachment of one's own witness. So long as the courts continue to consider the impeaching testimony objectionable as substantive evidence, however, the surprise and damage requirements provide desirable and workable
rules of thumb for limiting the amount of this type of testimony which will
go before a jury.19

John A. Ziegler, Jr., S.Ed.
Raymond Dittrich

16 See State v. Nelson, note 13 supra; Young v. United States, note 5 supra.
17 Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 P. 1099 (1922); Albert v. McKay &: Co., 174 Cal. 451,
163 P. 666 (1917).
18 For more extensive development of this argument, see: McCormick, "The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence," 25 TEX. L. R.Ev. 573 (1947); 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1018 (1940); Morgan, "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept," 62 HARv. L. R.Ev. 177, 192 (1948). See also Rule 63 (1), UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE.
19 See McCormick's informal study of the question of whether a judge's instruction
will be effective to prevent a jury from considering the impeaching testimony as substantive evidence. The judges he surveyed seemed to doubt if the jury understood or obeyed
the instruction. McCormick, "The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence," 25 TEX. L. R.Ev. 573 (1947).

